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1391 
DISCRIMINATING AGAINST THE DEAD: 
HOW TO PROTECT MUSLIM CEMETERIES 
FROM EXCLUSIONARY LAND  
USE MECHANISMS 
Abstract: U.S. Muslims face virulent, entrenched opposition in constructing the 
cemeteries that allow them to bury their dead according to Islamic law and tradi-
tion. Despite state and federal laws designed to guard against acts of religious 
discrimination such as the federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act (“RLUIPA”), local governments impede Muslim cemetery constructions 
via zoning ordinances and adjudicative permit denials. As a result of these ef-
forts, Muslims experience unfair discrimination as local land control bodies un-
duly delay or block their attempts to build cemeteries. To better protect Muslims’ 
rights in land use disputes, this Note advocates for amendments to RLUIPA’s key 
provisions, namely, adding a definition of “substantial burden,” delineating what 
land uses constitute “religious exercise,” and creating measures to punish dis-
criminatory action by local governments. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the Islamic Society of Greater Worcester (“Islamic Society”) pur-
chased a fifty-five acre plot of farmland in the small town of Dudley, Massachu-
setts.1 The Islamic Society intended to convert the plot into a burial ground 
where members could bury their dead according to Islamic tradition.2 In Islamic 
                                                                                                                           
 1 David Boeri, Proposal for Muslim Cemetery in Dudley Meets Opposition from Residents, 
WBUR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/all-things-considered/2016/02/
05/muslim-cemetery-proposal [https://perma.cc/T92Z-J8PA] [hereinafter Boeri, Proposal for Muslim 
Cemetery]. Based on the 2010 census, Dudley has a population of 11,390. Dudley Demographics, 
http://dudleyma.gov/about/demographics [https://perma.cc/WB56-FF3U]. Dudley is located in south 
central Massachusetts, along the Connecticut border. Id. It is about twenty-two miles south of Worces-
ter and fifty-nine miles southwest of Boston. Id. The Islamic Society of Greater Worcester (“Islamic 
Society”) is a community of over 350 Muslim families based around Worcester. About Us, ISLAMIC 
SOC’Y OF GREATER WORCESTER, http://isgw.us/about-us [https://perma.cc/N948-97MZ]. 
 2 Boeri, Proposal for Muslim Cemetery, supra note 1. Muslim laws and customs espouse strict 
and detailed rules about how the dead are to be buried. Mohamed Ebrahim Siala, Authentic Step by 
Step Illustrated Janazah Guide, MISSION ISLAM, http://www.missionislam.com/knowledge/janazah
stepbystep.htm [https://perma.cc/387W-K6LN]. Burial responsibilities begin even before the individ-
ual has deceased; when an individual is close to death, relatives and friends gather around them, recite 
various prayers, and offer comfort and support. See id. After death, the decedent’s eyes are to be 
closed, jaw bound, and body covered in a clean sheet. Id. The body is then carefully washed by family 
members or trusted friends in a deliberate process. Id. After washing, the decedent is shrouded with 
several inexpensive white sheets and a funeral service is held. Id. The burial then occurs as soon as 
possible and should be near where the deceased lived. Id. The Islamic burial style is “characterized by 
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tradition, Muslims must be buried in their own cemeteries.3 The only other Mus-
lim cemetery near Dudley, Massachusetts is located in Enfield, Connecticut, 
which is over sixty miles away.4 This is a far distance for Islamic Society mem-
bers to travel to bury their dead, posing additional challenges for them to follow 
Muslim burial procedures.5 The fifty-five acre plot of farmland was therefore a 
prime location to construct a much closer Muslim cemetery.6 The process for 
converting that plot of farmland originally appeared as easy as buying the land 
and getting a permit to build the cemetery, but instead turned into a year-long 
fight between the Islamic Society and the town of Dudley (“Dudley”), attracting 
national and international attention.7 
The fifty-five acre plot proposed for the construction of a cemetery was 
zoned as a residential area.8 Dudley law therefore required the Islamic Society to 
apply for a special permit to construct the cemetery.9 It was clear that the Islamic 
Society would face an uphill battle from the start of the special permit applica-
tion process, an initial hearing on February 4, 2016 in front of the Dudley Zon-
ing Board of Appeals (“Dudley Zoning Board”).10 Many Dudley residents at-
tended the hearing to express their concerns and objections to the cemetery.11 
                                                                                                                           
humility, simplicity and economy in costs and . . . avoids glorifying the dead with elaborate monu-
ments.” Id. The grave consists of a deep vertical hole in the ground, into which the decedent is placed 
on his or her right side, facing Mecca. Id. The decedent is not placed into a casket or a concrete vault. 
See id. 
 3 Siala, supra note 2. 
 4 Denise Lavoie, Backlash Greets Plans for Muslim Cemeteries Across US, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Apr. 25, 2016), https://apnews.com/58d4287818d94658ac52db51ddd94f36 [https://perma.cc/X883-
2WEB] [hereinafter Lavoie, Backlash]. 
 5 Boeri, Proposal for Muslim Cemetery, supra note 1. Islamic burial practices call for the de-
ceased to be buried as soon as possible after death, even on the same day if feasible. Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Associated Press, Cemetery Talks Between Muslim Group, Town at a Standstill, DAILY MAIL 
(Oct. 28, 2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3881748/Cemetery-talks-Muslim-group-
town-standstill.html [https://perma.cc/P7BS-UNYQ]; David Boeri, As Negotiations with Town of 
Dudley Falter, Islamic Society Seeks State, Federal Action, WBUR NEWS (Oct. 26, 2016), http://
www.wbur.org/news/2016/10/26/dudley-cemetery-state-federal-action [https://perma.cc/4TJ3-LUM8] 
[hereinafter Boeri, Negotiations Falter]; Denise Lavoie, Feds to Investigate Town’s Rejection of Mus-
lim Cemetery, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 18, 2016), https://apnews.com/e66c50bb793a48d28d
8592a34ffb24cf/feds-investigate-towns-rejection-muslim-cemetery [https://perma.cc/Z2U2-RPEY] 
[hereinafter Lavoie, Feds to Investigate]. The dispute expanded beyond the town of Dudley and the 
Islamic Society as the Massachusetts Attorney General’s office, U.S. Attorney’s Office, and the 
American Civil Liberties Union became involved in the case. Boeri, Negotiations Falter, supra. 
 8 Town of Dudley Massachusetts, Zoning 2016 02 04, YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 2016), https://
youtube/dD9pi09BB_0 [https://perma.cc/YV8U-AWXF] [hereinafter Zoning Board Video] (recording 
of zoning meeting). 
 9 Id. Dudley allows cemeteries to be constructed in residential districts upon receipt of a special 
permit from the Dudley Zoning Board of Appeals (“Dudley Zoning Board”). DUDLEY, MASS., ZON-
ING BYLAWS § 2.03.02 (2014). Residential districts are geographical areas designated for residential 
use and they exclude uses that could be detrimental to residential use. Id. 
 10 Boeri, Proposal for Muslim Cemetery, supra note 1. 
 11 Id.; Zoning Board Video, supra note 8. 
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For example, one Dudley resident explained, “I really don’t want to see any 
cemetery here . . . it’s quiet and I’d like to keep it that way.”12 Other residents 
expressed health concerns over possible contamination of the town’s ground and 
well water due to the Muslim practice of burying the dead directly in the ground 
instead of in caskets.13 Other residents expressed more general concerns about 
the Islamic Society’s Muslim identity.14 The Islamic Society emphasized that 
they were fellow Massachusetts residents simply looking for a place to bury the 
dead in their community.15 Moreover, as a religious organization, the Islamic 
Society argued that Massachusetts state law exempted it from municipal zoning 
ordinances and, therefore, the Dudley Zoning Board had to approve the cemetery 
proposal.16 
At a second hearing on March 3, 2016, the Islamic Society’s troubles con-
tinued.17 Dudley residents once again expressed their opposition to the proposal; 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Boeri, Proposal for Muslim Cemetery, supra note 1. The irony in this concern is apparent; 
cemeteries are typically very quiet places. Christina Couch, Living Next to Cemeteries: Plots with 
Peace, Quiet—and Great Home Values?, AOL.: FINANCE (June 30, 2010), https://www.aol.com/
2010/06/30/living-next-to-cemeteries-peace-quiet-and-great-home-values/ [https://perma.cc/2KTK-
AFSQ]. 
 13 Boeri, Proposal for Muslim Cemetery, supra note 1. Residents expressed concerns because of 
the high water table of the parcel and the presence of ponds and other wetlands on the land. See Zon-
ing Board Video, supra note 8. The threat of groundwater contamination is a common argument 
against Muslim cemeteries. See Chris Joyner, Fear of the Dead One of Many Fringe Ideas Fueling 
Mosque Debate, ATL. J.-CONST. (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.myajc.com/news/news/local-govt-
politics/fear-of-the-dead-one-of-many-fringe-ideas-fueling-/nsx9M/ [https://perma.cc/77LQ-KBGN] 
(similar fears expressed against proposal in Newton County, Georgia). Researchers have determined 
that such fears of water contamination are largely unfounded. See id. 
 14 Boeri, Proposal for Muslim Cemetery, supra note 1. One person asked when the group would 
propose to build a mosque; another questioned when he would have to listen to the “crazy music” of 
the call to prayer. Id. The Muslim call to prayer, also known as Adhan, is a message broadcast five 
times per day from mosques indicating times for prayer. Isaac A. Weiner, Calling Everyone to Pray: 
Pluralism, Secularism, and the Adhan in Hamtramck, Michigan, 87 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 1049, 
1054 (2014). Loudspeakers are often used to convey the call and critics complain of the noise. See, 
e.g., Tara John, Israel Wants Mosques to Lower the Volume on the Muslim Call to Prayer, TIME (Dec. 
12, 2016), http://time.com/4597619/muslim-call-to-prayer-israel-mosques [https://perma.cc/M762-
873H]. 
 15 Boeri, Proposal for Muslim Cemetery, supra note 1. 
 16 Id.; Zoning Board Video, supra note 8. The Islamic Society, represented by attorney Jason 
Talerman, argued that the Dover Amendment to Massachusetts laws governing municipal zoning was 
dispositive of the proposal and that the Dudley Zoning Board could not legally deny the permit absent 
extraordinary circumstances. Zoning Board Video, supra note 8. Talerman conceded, however, that 
the Dudley Zoning Board could “reasonably regulate” the proposal. Id. Reasonable regulations could 
include imposing dimensional, parking and emergency vehicle access requirements. Id. The Dover 
Amendment discusses what land uses are exempt from zoning requirements. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
40A, § 3 (2016). The amendment states that no zoning ordinance or by-law shall “prohibit, regulate or 
restrict the use of land or structures for religious purposes.” Id. Religious uses, however, may still be 
“subject to reasonable regulations.” Id. 
 17 David Boeri, Battle Continues over Proposed Muslim Cemetery in Town of Dudley, WBUR: 
ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Mar. 4, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/all-things-considered/2016/03/04/
dudley-rejects-muslim-cemetery [https://perma.cc/G5JP-VNLY] [hereinafter Boeri, Battle Continues]. 
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Town Administrator Greg Balukonis commented that the proposal had no public 
benefit and “provided no tax revenues, jobs[,] or recreational opportunities” to 
the town.18 Other residents took issue with the Islamic Society for being an out-
sider to the community; one Dudley resident explained “[t]hey don’t live in Dud-
ley, they’re not bringing anything into Dudley. They’re not going to pay taxes in 
Dudley. They basically just want to buy a piece of land and utilize it for whatev-
er they want to do.”19 The Islamic Society reiterated that, because the cemetery 
was intended for religious use, it was protected under the Dover Amendment and 
the Dudley Zoning Board could not deny the special permit.20 Town Counsel 
Gary Brackett cautioned that the cemetery proposal might not be exempt from 
zoning ordinances, arguing that the cemetery might actually be a commercial—
and not a religious—use.21 Furthermore, Brackett pointed out that Massachusetts 
law prohibited burial ground constructions without permission from the town 
and the board of health.22 The Dudley Zoning Board denied the Islamic Socie-
ty’s application for a special permit, but asked for another proposal providing 
more details about the cemetery and its potential impact on the land and the sur-
rounding neighborhood.23 
At yet another hearing on April 7, 2016, the battle between Dudley and the 
Islamic Society continued.24 Town Counsel Gary Brackett once again questioned 
the cemetery’s characterization as a religious use of the land.25 In June 2016, the 
Dudley Zoning Board finally reached a decision—it officially denied the special 
permit.26 The Dudley Zoning Board claimed it was not denying the Islamic So-
ciety from obtaining a special permit on the merits, but was instead ruling that 
the group did not actually have standing to seek a special permit for that plot of 
land in the first place.27 It further explained that the seller of the plot did not 
properly notify the town that she intended to sell the parcel and, because of the 
                                                                                                                           
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. The Dover Amendment does not apply to commercial uses of land. See MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 40A, § 3 (offering protection for “religious purposes” and not commercial). 
 22 Boeri, Battle Continues, supra note 17; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 114, § 34 (2016) (requiring 
land used for burial to have permission of town and the board of health). 
 23 Boeri, Battle Continues, supra note 17. 
 24 David Boeri, In Dudley, Debate Continues over Proposed Muslim Cemetery, WBUR: ALL 
THINGS CONSIDERED (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/all-things-considered/2016/04/08/dudley-
muslim-cemetery-debate [https://perma.cc/RQS9-6FWF]. 
 25 Id. Brackett argued that the Islamic Society had not explained whether religious ceremonies 
would take place at the cemetery along with burials, or if the religious ceremonies would take place at 
a mosque and the cemetery would only be used for burials. See id. He implied that the latter would not 
constitute a religious use. See id. 
 26 David Boeri, Town of Dudley Zoning Board Denies Permit for Proposed Muslim Cemetery, 
WBUR (June 10, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/Morningedition/2016/06/10/dudley-denies-muslim-
cemetery-permit [https://perma.cc/Q7HR-GVFS]. 
 27 Id. 
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land’s special tax status, the town had a right of first refusal to buy the land be-
fore it could be sold to the Islamic Society.28 
In light of the Dudley Zoning Board’s decision, the Islamic Society filed a 
lawsuit against Dudley in the Massachusetts Land Court, arguing that the town 
was being “unfair and prejudicial.”29 The Islamic Society’s struggle then caught 
the attention of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which began investigating Dudley for 
potential civil rights violations.30 The announcement of the federal investigation 
garnered attention from national media sources and the American Civil Liberties 
Union.31 In response to the national spotlight, Dudley announced that it would 
not exercise the right of first refusal to the land and expressed hope of reaching a 
diplomatic solution with the Islamic Society.32 In December 2017, the Islamic 
Society and Dudley reached an agreement to allow the cemetery’s construction 
subject to final, routine approval.33 Then, in March 2017, the Dudley Zoning 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Id. In the real estate context, the right of first refusal is the right to purchase a property from the 
seller before it is given to a third party. Bernard Daskal, Right of First Refusal and the Package Deal, 
22 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 461, 461–62 (1995). The Dudley Zoning Board claimed that it had the right 
of first refusal to the land in question under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 61A because the 
land had a special agricultural tax status. Kim Ring, Islamic Society Taking Dudley to Court over 
Cemetery Permit Denial, TELEGRAM.COM (June 30, 2016), http://www.telegram.com/news/2016
0630/islamic-society-taking-dudley-to-court-over-cemetery-permit-denial [https://perma.cc/77U5-
5YGP]; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 61A, § 14 (giving municipalities the option to purchase land taxed 
under the chapter). 
 29 David Boeri, With Civil Rights Probe, Town of Dudley Is in the Spotlight for Muslim Cemetery 
Controversy, WBUR (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/Morningedition/2016/08/19/dudley-
cemetery-civil-rights-investigation [https://perma.cc/C2NR-W92E] [hereinafter Boeri, Civil Rights 
Probe]; Islamic Center Sues Town of Dudley over Rejection of Proposed Cemetery, WBUR NEWS 
(July 1, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/news/2016/07/01/islamic-center-sues-town-of-dudley-over-
rejection-of-proposed-cemetery [https://perma.cc/FWZ3-9KF5]. The Massachusetts Land Court (“the 
Land Court”) has jurisdiction over most property issues including appeals from zoning boards of ap-
peals. Land Court Department, MASS.GOV, http://www.mass.gov/courts/court-info/trial-court/lc/ 
[https://perma.cc/P7A3-VQYY]. 
 30 Boeri, Civil Rights Probe, supra note 29. U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts Car-
men Ortiz announced that she would look into whether the Dudley Zoning Board unreasonably 
blocked the proposal in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”) and discriminated against the Islamic Society on the basis of religion. Lavoie, Feds to 
Investigate, supra note 7. 
 31 Boeri, Civil Rights Probe, supra note 29; Lavoie, Feds to Investigate, supra note 7. 
 32 Boeri, Civil Rights Probe, supra note 29. Dudley waived its right of first refusal in the hopes 
that the case in the Land Court would be remanded back to the Dudley Zoning Board, but the Land 
Court disagreed and retained jurisdiction over the case to determine if the Islamic Society had a pro-
tected legal right to build the cemetery. David Boeri, Case of Proposed Muslim Cemetery in Dudley 
Will Remain in Land Court, WBUR NEWS (Sep. 7, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/news/2016/09/07/
dudley-muslim-cemetery-case-land-court [https://perma.cc/S5NG-8JGR]. 
 33 David Boeri, Islamic Society, Town of Dudley Reach Deal for Muslim Cemetery, WBUR NEWS 
(Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.wbur.org/news/2016/12/23/dudley-muslim-cemetery-approval [https://
perma.cc/W5VW-XTWR] [hereinafter Boeri, Deal for Muslim Cemetery]. In the settlement, Dudley 
agreed that the cemetery was a religious use and qualified for protection under state law. Id. 
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Board approved the cemetery proposal and issued a special permit.34 Despite this 
approval, the Islamic Society ultimately canceled the proposal and decided to 
pursue building the cemetery in Worcester.35 
The story of the Islamic Society’s process to construct their cemetery, while 
ultimately having a favorable ending, did little to secure the legal rights of Mus-
lims to build cemeteries.36 First, the Islamic Society got lucky; efforts of other 
Muslim groups across the country have faced similar challenges in attempting to 
build their own burial sites and have not been successful.37 Second, the Islamic 
Society’s proposal ended in a settlement, without the establishment of binding 
precedent, and thus the law remains unresolved.38 This Note examines the ways 
that the current legal and political frameworks of land use regulations do not 
adequately protect Muslims’ rights and therefore allow local governments to un-
fairly discriminate against their religious practices by unduly delaying or block-
ing their attempts to build cemeteries.39 Part I discusses the history and current 
state of land use regulation, the incorporation of cemeteries into those regulatory 
schemes, and relevant state and federal mechanisms that protect religious land 
uses.40 Part II analyzes the ways that the politicized nature of the regulatory 
frameworks and the shortcomings in federal land use protection jurisprudence 
allow discrimination against Muslims to persist.41 Finally, Part III advocates for 
an expansion of the current land use jurisprudence and the creation of punitive 
measures to dissuade local governments from discriminating against Muslims.42 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Brian MacQuarrie, Plan for Muslim Cemetery in Dudley Clears Last Hurdle, BOS. GLOBE 
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/03/03/plan-for-muslim-cemetery-dudley-
clears-last-hurdle/Xx4WdIQ7WX4tywuuRXu5qJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/M8XM-TGH4]. 
 35 Brian MacQuarrie, After Bitter Fight for Approval, Islamic Society Abruptly Drops Plan for 
Cemetery in Town of Dudley, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/
2017/04/13/after-bitter-fight-for-approval-islamic-society-abruptly-drops-plan-for-cemetery-town-
dudley/JZ7H61XR2fxMc88AcZp6ZN/story.html [https://perma.cc/FZD7-TT97]. While the dispute 
between the Islamic Society and the town was still ongoing, Worcester officials approached the Islam-
ic Society and offered them a portion of an existing cemetery in the city. Id. 
 36 See Lavoie, Backlash, supra note 4 (identifying other situations were Muslims faced opposition 
to cemetery construction). 
 37 Id. Other locations where Muslim cemetery proposals faced similar obstacles are Farmersville, 
Texas; Walpole, Massachusetts; Carlisle, Pennsylvania; and Farmington, Minnesota. Id. Newton 
County, Georgia faced a similar situation where residents urged the local adjudicative body to block 
the construction of a Muslim cemetery, basing their concerns on the potential for groundwater con-
tamination. Joyner, supra note 13. 
 38 See Boeri, Deal for Muslim Cemetery, supra note 33 (explaining that as part of the settlement, 
the Islamic Society agreed to drop the suit in the Land Court). 
 39 See infra notes 43–180 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 43–105 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 106–180 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 181–259 and accompanying text. 
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I. HOW THE DEAD FELL UNDER THE CONTROL OF MUNICIPAL  
LAND USE MECHANISMS 
Land use in the United States is regulated by an extensive framework of or-
dinances, legislation, and other mechanisms.43 These regulations control and 
limit how property owners can purchase and sell their land, what uses are al-
lowed on the land, what structures can be built on the land, where those struc-
tures must be located on the land, and numerous other aspects of land use and 
development.44 Because these land use regulatory powers affect all land in the 
United States, the regulation of religious land use is inevitable.45 The First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, however, affords certain protec-
tions to the exercise of religion which is reflected in land use regulations to an 
extent.46 As an exercise of religion, cemeteries fall within, and are regulated by, 
this larger land use regulatory framework.47 
A. The Land Use Regulatory Framework 
The government’s ability to regulate land use and development is a substan-
tial intrusion into private property owners’ rights yet courts have long recognized 
the legitimacy of the government’s power to do so.48 Authority for land use regu-
lation resides primarily at the local level in the hands of municipal government, 
rather than at the state and federal level.49 One common way that municipal gov-
ernments exercise their land use powers is through zoning ordinances.50 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Note, The Future of Zoning Limitations upon Religious Uses of 
Land: Due Process or Equal Protection?, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1988) (discussing 
zoning one of the principle land use mechanisms). Local agencies, such as the board of health, also 
impact land use. See Boeri, Battle Continues, supra note 17 (noting permission of the town board of 
health is necessary for cemetery constructions in Massachusetts). 
 44 See, e.g., DUDLEY, MASS., ZONING BYLAWS § 1.01.00 (outlining the town’s land use controls 
and the limits they place on use of the land). 
 45 Macleod-Ball, supra note 43, at 1087. 
 46 Id. at 1087 n.3. The Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution provides: “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
 47 See DUDLEY, MASS., ZONING BYLAWS § 2.03.02 (identifying cemeteries as being included as 
part of the land use control mechanisms). 
 48 Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (recognizing legality 
of municipal zoning); Macleod-Ball, supra note 43, at 1090–91. 
 49 See John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System: A Diagnostic Ap-
proach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 821, 821 (2006) 
(explaining the power of land use control is retained by the states who delegate the powers to local 
governments). Cities and towns are created by state legislatures and can exercise a wide range of 
powers delegated to them by the legislature. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, §§ 1–69 (2016) (out-
lining powers and duties of cities and towns). The federal government generally does not engage in 
zoning at the local level, but rather exercises its regulatory powers on narrower issues with national 
implications. See Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2017) (creating a program 
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In 1926, the United States Supreme Court recognized the legality and legit-
imacy of municipal zoning in Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Compa-
ny.51 The Court upheld zoning measures designed to control the locations of in-
dustrial development in the Village.52 The Court reasoned that zoning laws, a 
relatively new development at the time, were valid exercises of the municipali-
ty’s police powers to protect the community’s health, safety, and welfare.53 
Through zoning ordinances, municipal governments are able to exert substantial 
control over the land under its jurisdiction.54 
Zoning ordinances are created by the municipal government’s legislative 
body.55 State law requires a board of appeals to oversee the administration of 
zoning issues.56 Zoning ordinances provide a comprehensive list of what land 
uses are permitted in the various districts established by the ordinance.57 Some 
of the land uses are allowed by right, whereas others require the use of a special 
permit.58 Uses by special permit allow a given board to function as an adjudica-
tive body and exercise discretion in whether it chooses to approve, deny, or con-
                                                                                                                           
to regulate land uses “to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance, the 
resources of the Nation’s coastal zone for this and succeeding generations”); Nolon, supra, at 822. 
 50 Macleod-Ball, supra note 43, at 1090–91. Zoning ordinances control what uses are allowed on 
a particular piece of land as well as the dimensional, density, and set back requirements of the lots. 
See, e.g., DUDLEY, MASS., ZONING BYLAWS § 1.01.00. 
 51 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 390; Macleod-Ball, supra note 43, at 1091. 
 52 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 390. To control new development in the town emanating from the expan-
sion of nearby Cleveland, Ohio, the town of Euclid created a zoning scheme whereby the town’s land 
was classified according to six categories of uses ranging from residential to industrial. Id. at 379–80. 
Ambler Realty Company sought to develop a parcel of land that was zoned as residential and chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the zoning scheme. Id. at 379, 384. 
 53 Id. at 387; Macleod-Ball, supra note 43, at 1091. The Court recognized that the circumstances 
of urban development necessitated new land use control mechanisms. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386–87. 
Recognizing Euclid’s “authority to govern itself as it sees fit, within the limits of the organic law of its 
creation and the state and federal Constitution,” the Court held that the zoning ordinance was valid 
given its rational relation to health, safety, and welfare. Id. at 389–90. Some of the factors that bore on 
the relationship to health, safety, and welfare were the zoning ordinance’s capacity to reduce street 
and traffic accidents, ensure better deployment of fire-fighting equipment, and increase overall safety. 
Id. at 394. 
 54 Macleod-Ball, supra note 43, at 1090. 
 55 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5 (indicating zoning ordinances and by-laws are created by 
the city council or board of selectmen, which are legislative bodies). Massachusetts General Laws 
chapter 40A, section 5 outlines the procedures for adopting and creating zoning ordinances. Id. A 
proposed ordinance must be presented to the city council or board of selectman. Id. The planning 
board must then hold a public hearing and provide a report to the board of selectman or city council. 
Id. The ordinance will not be adopted or changed unless there is a two-thirds majority of the board of 
selectmen, city council, or residents in favor of the ordinance. Id. 
 56 Id. at §§ 12, 14. The zoning board of appeals possesses the power to “hear and decide ap-
peals[,] applications for special permits[,] and petitions for variances.” Id. at § 14. 
 57 See, e.g., DUDLEY, MASS., ZONING BYLAWS § 2.03.02. 
 58 Id. Uses “by right” are permitted to the property holder without the need to obtain a special 
permit. Id. Uses by special permit require the zoning board of appeals to grant a permit. Id. 
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ditionally approve the application.59 Special permits are therefore another pow-
erful tool for municipalities to regulate land use.60 
Municipal governments’ power to engage in land use regulation through 
zoning ordinances and special permits is broad and difficult for challengers to 
overturn in court.61 Courts defer to the legislative power of municipal govern-
ments and only overturn zoning ordinances if they are “clearly arbitrary and un-
reasonable, having no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or gen-
eral welfare.”62 Challengers to special permit denials or overly burdensome con-
ditions face a similarly high burden.63 A zoning board’s power is “discretionary, 
but not without limits;” it cannot act “arbitrar[ily], whimsical[ly], or capri-
cious[ly].”64 Given the deference courts show towards municipalities, individu-
als or organizations who feel aggrieved by the process face a very difficult road 
to challenge municipal decisions.65 For religious organizations seeking to over-
turn a municipal ordinance restricting certain religious land uses, achieving a 
victory in court is exceedingly challenging.66 
                                                                                                                           
 59 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 9. Massachusetts General Laws chapter 40A, section 9 requires a 
zoning board of appeals to review special permit applications at a public hearing. Id. Special permit 
applications are approved by a two-thirds vote of that zoning board. Id. That board must issue its deci-
sion within ninety days after the hearing. Id. 
 60 See id. (identifying the considerable discretion municipal governments have over special permit 
applications). 
 61 See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (providing the standard for zoning ordinances to be declared un-
constitutional). 
 62 Id.; see also Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 987 (Cal. 2015) (hold-
ing ordinances are presumed to be valid and the party challenging an ordinance has the burden of 
showing the lack of a reasonable relationship to public welfare). 
 63 See Murphy v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lawrence, 317 N.E.2d 90, 91 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974) 
(describing the standard courts use to review challenges to special permit decisions); Vazza Props., 
Inc. v. City Council of Woburn, 296 N.E.2d 220, 222 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973) (holding zoning boards 
have discretion to deny an application for a special permit, but it cannot be an arbitrary decision). 
 64 See Murphy, 317 N.E.2d at 91 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Bd. of Appeals of Framingham, 244 
N.E.2d 311, 313 (Mass. 1969)). Special permit conditions are limited by the requirements that the 
Supreme Court set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission. and Dolan v. City of Tigard—
that conditions must bear a rational nexus and rough proportionality to the harm caused by the pro-
posed land use. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013) (summa-
rizing the combined effect of Nollan and Dolan); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) 
(establishing the rough proportionality requirement); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 
837 (1987) (establishing the nexus requirement). 
 65 See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d at 991 (explaining the difficulty challengers to municipal 
land use actions face given municipalities’ broad discretion to take action for public welfare). 
 66 See id. 
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B. The Interment of Cemeteries into the Land Use Framework 
Death is one of humanity’s most sobering, ubiquitous, and unavoidable cer-
tainties.67 From a pragmatic, psychological, and sociological standpoint, decid-
ing what to do with the human body after death has been one of society’s great-
est dilemmas.68 Throughout human history, different civilizations and cultures 
have responded to this dilemma in diverse ways.69 In Judeo-Christian-Islamic 
tradition, burial is the most common method of disposing human remains.70 As 
populations in America began shifting to densely concentrated cities during the 
nineteenth century, burying the dead became an important concern of urban 
planning.71 
Today, cemeteries are more often located independently from church sites 
and are designed with considerable care.72 Managing current cemeteries and fu-
ture development falls under the purview of municipal land use powers.73 Mu-
nicipalities, as well as state and federal governments, have developed ways to 
control and regulate cemeteries.74 At the local level, many municipalities classify 
cemeteries as a land use that requires a special permit to construct.75 According-
ly, to construct a cemetery, a builder must apply for and obtain a special permit 
from a municipal government.76 As such, cemeteries have been incorporated into 
the larger land use regulatory framework.77 Because cemeteries are part of the 
land use framework, municipal governments are able to exercise considerable 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Benjamin Franklin Quotes, NOTABLE QUOTES, http://www.notable-quotes.com/f/franklin_
benjamin.html [https://perma.cc/PU8S-UBQD] (Benjamin Franklin referred to death as one of life’s 
two certainties). 
 68 See generally William J. Whalen, How Different Religions Pay Their Final Respects, in DEATH 
DYING & BEREAVEMENT (George Dickinson et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (explaining the various ways 
different religions and cultures have dealt with death and disposing human remains). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 176–77. Part of the reasoning for this is the idea that the body must be preserved for the 
resurrection during the final judgment. Id. at 177. 
 71 See History, MOUNT AUBURN CEMETERY, http://mountauburn.org/category/history [https://
perma.cc/NBP9-AK38] (describing how burials became a concern of urban planning during the nine-
teenth century). 
 72 See, e.g., id. (noting Mount Auburn Cemetery located in Cambridge, Massachusetts as an ex-
ample of the trend of the development of independently located cemeteries). 
 73 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 114, § 34; DUDLEY, MASS., DUDLEY, MASS., ZONING BYLAWS 
§ 2.03.02. 
 74 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 114, § 34 (state); DUDLEY, MASS., ZONING BYLAWS § 2.03.02 
(municipalities). The federal government maintains an extensive system of national cemeteries used 
for the interment of deceased service members and veterans. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 2400–2414 (2017) 
(providing for national cemeteries and memorials). 
 75 See e.g., DUDLEY, MASS., ZONING BYLAWS § 2.03.02. The Dudley zoning ordinances require 
cemeteries in residential districts to obtain a special permit. Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id.; see Foster v. Mayor of City of Beverly, 53 N.E.2d 693, 696 (Mass. 1944) (holding ordi-
nances regulating cemeteries were a valid exercise of police powers). 
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control over their construction and expansion.78 The power to control where a 
religious organization can bury their dead—or if a particular group can bury 
their dead at all—therefore rests in the hands of local politicians.79 
C. The Special Protections for Religious Land Uses 
Constitutional protections for the free exercise of religion and the restrictive 
nature of municipal land use regulations create potential conflicts between the 
right of municipalities to regulate land and the right of religious groups to prac-
tice their faith.80 Both state and federal governments have therefore taken certain 
measures to ensure that religious land uses are protected.81 
Protection for religious land uses is codified at the federal level under the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).82 RLUIPA 
was designed to protect religious land uses from discriminatory decisions by 
local municipalities.83 With limited exceptions, RLUIPA prohibits government 
entities from implementing land use regulations that impose a substantial burden 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Foster, 53 N.E.2d at 696 (allowing municipal government to determine where to locate 
cemeteries). 
 79 See DUDLEY, MASS., ZONING BYLAWS § 2.03.02 (stipulating cemeteries can only be con-
structed with a special permit granted by the town zoning board of appeals). 
 80 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (preventing government prohibition of the free exercise of religion); 
Macleod-Ball, supra note 43, at 1087–88, 1087 n.3 (explaining an example of this conflict would be a 
zoning ordinance that prohibits churches or the denial of a special permit to build or modify a church). 
 81 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 3; Anthony C. Zecca, Jr., Note, A Decade Since 9/11: Religious 
Land Use Discrimination and the Continued Need for Protective Judicial Measures Under RLUIPA, 
21 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 275, 276 (2011). The principle statutory protection for religious 
land uses in Massachusetts is the Dover Amendment, which states that zoning ordinances, or by-laws, 
cannot regulate or restrict the use of land for religious uses. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 3. The Dover 
Amendment does not exclude religious organizations from all municipal land use controls, as it permits 
municipalities to reasonably regulate the land subject to bulk, dimension, setbacks, parking, and other 
similar regulations. Id. Municipalities, however, cannot “through the guise of regulating bulk and dimen-
sional requirements under the enabling statute, proceed to ‘nullify’ the use exemption.” Bible Speaks v. 
Bd. of Appeals of Lenox, 391 N.E.2d 279, 284 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). The legislature’s rationale for 
providing these protections to religious land uses was to ensure that a municipality could not “exercise its 
preferences as to what kind of . . . religious denominations it will welcome . . . .” Needham Pastoral 
Counseling Ctr., Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals of Needham, 557 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Mass. Ct. App. 1990). Fur-
thermore, the Dover Amendment “adopts the constitutional principle that local authority may not, with-
out compelling state interest, use zoning regulations to burden religious practices . . . .” Id. at 47. The 
Dover Amendment provides religious organizations with a significant ability to challenge municipal land 
use regulations that would prevent their religious building projects. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 3. 
 82 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2017); Zecca, supra note 81, at 276. RLUIPA only protects religious 
groups from discrimination by means of land use mechanisms. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 83 Zecca, supra note 81, at 276. RLUIPA was a more tailored attempt to protect religious land 
uses than Congress’s previous attempt, the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 
(“RFRA”). Id. RFRA required government actions that “substantially burden[ed]” the exercise of 
religion to be subjected to a stricter degree of judicial review. Id. The Supreme Court, however, held 
RFRA unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); Zecca, supra note 81, at 
276. 
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on the free exercise of religion.84 RLUIPA allows plaintiffs to seek “appropriate 
relief” in judicial proceedings and allows the United States to bring an action 
against a municipality seeking injunctive or declaratory relief for violations of its 
provisions.85 Despite these significant protections, the United States Supreme 
Court has not interpreted RLUIPA to provide the fullest possible protection for 
religious land uses that RUIPA’s broad language implies.86 Additionally, courts 
have been hesitant to subject land use measures to strict scrutiny absent overt 
discrimination.87 Moreover, zoning ordinance challengers must prove that the 
ordinance imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, a thresh-
old that is often difficult to meet.88 Similarly, municipalities are still allowed to 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). RLUIPA provides: 
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that im-
poses a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious 
assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the bur-
den on that person, assembly, or institution—(A) is in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
Id. In addition, section (b)(3) provides that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use 
regulation that—(A) totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction; or (B) unreasonably 
limits religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction.” Id. § 2000cc(b)(3). 
 85 Id. § 2000cc–2(a), (f). 
 86 See Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of Conn., Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Town of 
Newtown, 941 A.2d 868, 888–89 (Conn. 2008) (explaining RLUIPA’s definition of “religious exer-
cise” is broader than the Supreme Court’s traditional definition in its First Amendment jurisprudence 
and declining to hold that any regulation that affects the land used for religious purposes could trigger 
RLUIPA’s protections). 
 87 See Zecca, supra note 81, at 277; see also Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 
F.3d 338, 351 (2d Cir. 2007) (Westchester III) (finding the arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful charac-
ter to be significant in the analysis of discrimination). Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of judicial 
review in a due process analysis. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical 
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 800 (2006). Courts will 
strike down government actions under a strict scrutiny review unless the government can show (1) a 
compelling interest justifying the actions, and (2) that the action is the least restrictive means of 
achieving that interest. Id. Applying strict scrutiny, courts will generally invalidate laws that infringe 
upon religious practices because of their religious motivation unless they are justified by a compelling 
state interest and are narrowly tailored to advance that interest. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526, 547 (1993) (holding ordinances that restricted animal 
sacrifices of the Santeria religion were invalid). 
 88 Westchester III, 504 F.3d at 348–50. Substantial burden is “a term of art in the Supreme 
Court’s free exercise jurisprudence.” Id. at 348. The Court finds a substantial burden to exist where an 
individual is forced to “choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, 
on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion . . . on the other hand.” Id. Courts 
have found that in the land use context, religious institutions do not face the same dilemma. Id. at 
348–49. The denial of a religious institution’s building proposal will not impose a substantial burden 
when there are opportunities for the institution to submit a second application or if the denial will only 
have a minimal impact on the religious exercise. Id. at 349. Accordingly, “courts confronting free 
exercise challenges to zoning restrictions rarely find the substantial burden test satisfied even when 
the resulting effect is to completely prohibit a religious congregation from building a church on its 
own land.” Id. at 350. 
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require special permits for religious land uses, provided that they do not impose 
a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.89 Therefore, although it provides 
religious organizations with a federal cause of action against discriminatory or-
dinances, RLUIPA does not completely protect religious organizations from dis-
crimination.90 Moreover, although RLUIPA provides an auspicious sign for 
Muslim organizations, including the Islamic Society, such groups face an addi-
tional obstacle—their faith.91 
D. Anti-Muslim Sentiment 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States, Muslims living in the United States have faced serious and overt discrim-
ination.92 This discrimination manifests in many forms and poses a serious threat 
to Muslim-Americans’ legal rights, their well-being, and their lives.93 Muslim-
Americans have been physically assaulted, Muslim-American children have 
been harassed and denied the opportunity to pray in schools, and mosques have 
been vandalized and set on fire.94 
Anti-Muslim sentiments reemerged with vigor during the 2016 U.S. Presi-
dential election.95 Throughout his campaign, President Donald Trump’s rhetoric 
fueled these sentiments.96 While campaigning, President Trump announced plans 
to ban Muslim immigration to the United States in its entirety or, alternatively, 
subject potential Muslim immigrants to “extreme vetting.”97 President Trump 
also announced a plan to require all Muslims currently living in the United 
                                                                                                                           
 89 Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 998–99 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding condi-
tions that only amounted to a minor burden on religious exercise did not impose a substantial burden); 
see also Grace Church of Roaring Fork Valley v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Pitkin Cty., Colo., 742 F. 
Supp. 2d 1156, 1163 (finding denial of Church’s application for a special permit was not a substantial 
burden on exercise of religion but rather only prevented the church from using a particular property). 
 90 Zecca, supra note 81, at 277 (outlining the persistence of discrimination despite RLUIPA). 
 91 Id. at 275 (explaining Muslims experience particularly virulent discrimination). 
 92 Id. at 276. The September 11 attacks were carried out by al-Qaeda, a group of Islamic extrem-
ists. Peter L. Bergen, September 11 Attacks, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.
com/event/September-11-attacks [https://perma.cc/RHV8-CHWU]. 
 93 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RELIGIOUS LAND 
USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT 1–2 (Sept. 22, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/rluipa_report_092210.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WJ8-78QD] (outlin-
ing discrimination and violence against Muslims). 
 94 Id. Post 9/11, such anti-Muslim sentiments have resulted in an overwhelming number of hate 
crimes against Muslim communities. Eric Licthblau, U.S. Hate Crimes Surge 6%, Fueled by Attacks 
on Muslims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2016, at A13. This number has increased over time as 2015 saw 
the highest level of hate crimes against Muslims since 2001. Id. In 2015, there were 257 reports of 
attacks on Muslims and mosques, a sixty-seven percent rise from 2014. Id. 
 95 Licthblau, supra note 94. 
 96 Madeline Conway, Trump Stokes Fears He’ll Pursue Muslim Ban, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 2016), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/trump-muslim-ban-kellyanne-conway-232912 [https://perma.
cc/SN36-NFA8]. 
 97 Id. 
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States to be placed on a government registry.98 These statements correlated with 
heightened levels of Muslim hate crimes; following the call to ban Muslims 
from entering the United States in the wake of the San Bernardino terrorist at-
tack, there was an eighty-seven percent rise in hate crimes against Muslims.99 
Soon after taking office, President Trump followed through on his campaign 
promise and issued an executive order barring refugees and individuals from 
certain, predominately Muslim countries from entering the United States.100 
In the land use context, these anti-Muslim sentiments have a pernicious im-
pact on Muslims’ ability to construct religious structures.101 Building proposals 
for Muslim religious structures have routinely encountered fierce resistance from 
communities who resent their presence.102 Local governments, influenced by 
these community pressures, respond with discriminatory actions that stall or de-
lay the projects.103 It is within this larger social context that Muslim organiza-
tions such as the Islamic Society attempt to construct their religious infrastruc-
ture.104 The impact that these anti-Muslim sentiments can have on municipal 
land use bodies is significant, and the current regulatory framework does not 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Id. 
 99 Clare Foran, Donald Trump and the Rise of Anti-Muslim Violence, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 22, 
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-muslims-islamophobia-hate-crime/
500840 [https://perma.cc/LDZ3-Q7FZ]. The San Bernardino terror attack was a December 2, 2015 
incident where two heavily armed Muslim individuals went on a shooting spree in San Bernardino, 
California, killing fourteen people and injuring seventeen. Adam Nagourney et al., San Bernardino 
Shooting Kills at Least 14; Two Suspects Are Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2015, at A1. 
 100 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017). The executive order barred refu-
gees from entering the United States for 120 days and prohibited the admission of individuals from 
certain Middle Eastern countries for ninety days. Id. In addition, the order barred entry into the United 
States by those from seven Muslim-majority “countries of concern”: Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, 
Sudan, and Yemen. See id.; Full Text of Trump’s Executive Order on 7-Nation Ban, Refugee Suspen-
sion, CNN (Jan. 28, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/text-of-trump-executive-order-
nation-ban-refugees/index.html [https://perma.cc/TQ2J-WRBB] (identifying the “countries of con-
cern”). Federal courts rendered that executive order unconstitutional and President Trump then issued 
a second order, which was also ruled unconstitutional. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 
(Mar. 9, 2017) (second executive order); Matt Zapotosky, Second Federal Judge Blocks Revised 
Trump Travel Ban, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-
issues/second-federal-judge-blocks-revised-trump-travel-ban/2017/03/16/dc47cd1e-0a2a-11e7-93dc-
00f9bdd74ed1_story.html?utm_term=.0fd708035533 [https://perma.cc/8R7Y-WR4W]. 
 101 Zecca, supra note 81, at 275. 
 102 See Heather Greenfield, Comment, International Law, Religious Limitations, and Cultural 
Sensitivity: The Park51 Mosque at Ground Zero, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1317, 1317 (2011). For 
example, resistance towards an attempt to build a mosque near Ground Zero in New York City was high-
ly publicized, with President Trump expressing his opposition to the proposal saying “[i]t is wrong” and 
offering to buy the property himself. Id.; Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 10, 
2012, 2:45 PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/278269256657956865 [https://perma.cc/
E8VY-EREZ]. 
 103 Zecca, supra note 81, at 275. 
 104 See Greenfield, supra note 102, at 1317. 
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provide sufficient protection for Muslims against these negative external pres-
sures.105 
II. WHY MUSLIM CEMETERY PROPOSALS SUFFER SUCH MORBID  
FATES IN THE COURT SYSTEM 
Muslim organizations seeking to build cemeteries and other religious struc-
tures face significant obstacles in getting their building projects approved under 
the current land use regulatory framework.106 The primary obstacles are the po-
litical systems that comprise the local government entities in charge of land use 
regulation and the lack of effective judicial remedies.107 The politicized nature of 
municipal governments and insufficient judicial remedies prevent Muslim 
groups from enjoying their full rights to construct and expand religious struc-
tures without being unduly delayed or denied.108 Although these problems are 
magnified for Muslims, they have the potential to affect other religious groups as 
well.109 
A. The Politicized Nature of the Land Use Regulatory Framework 
Land use control mechanisms, such as ordinances and special permit re-
quirements, exist as part of an extensive regulatory framework.110 Because most 
land use control occurs at the local level, it is therefore municipal governments 
who are charged with administering the land use regulatory framework.111 Mu-
nicipal governments create zoning ordinances or bylaws, change the ordinances, 
decide what land uses require special permits, and adjudicate special permit ap-
plications.112 The power municipal governments can exercise in the context of 
land use controls is broader and much more extensive than that of the federal 
government.113 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See Zecca, supra note 81, at 276 (identifying the shortcomings of RLUIPA that allow discrim-
ination to persist). 
 106 See Greenfield, supra note 102, at 1317 (describing the difficulties Muslims experience con-
structing mosques). 
 107 See Zecca, supra note 81, at 276–77 (identifying the unsatisfactory nature of RLUIPA juris-
prudence and hostile political climates as problems for Muslims in the land use context). 
 108 See id. 
 109 See Greenfield, supra note 102, at 1317. 
 110 See Macleod-Ball, supra note 43, at 1087, 1090 (describing government administration of the 
land use regulatory system). 
 111 See id. 
 112 See, e.g., DUDLEY, MASS., ZONING BYLAWS § 1.01.00 (2014) (outlining the land use powers 
of Dudley, Massachusetts). 
 113 See Nolon, supra note 49, at 822 (explaining local governments have the power “to adopt land 
use plans, to establish uniform zoning districts . . . to review and approve land subdivision and site 
development . . . to achieve proper development patterns and to mitigate the adverse impacts of land 
development on natural resources and the environment”). See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, 
§§ 1–69 (2016) (outlining powers and duties of cities and towns). The federal government is one of 
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Cities and towns delegate their land use powers to various internal bodies 
in differing ways.114 In Massachusetts, for example, the power to create and 
change zoning ordinances or bylaws rests in the hands of a city council or board 
of selectmen.115 A zoning board of appeals oversees zoning issues and adjudi-
cates special permit applications.116 These two bodies differ in their organization 
and in the ways their membership is conferred.117 Zoning board of appeals 
members are appointed by the legislative branch of a municipality’s govern-
ment.118 In contrast, members of a city council or board of selectmen are elected 
by a locality’s residents.119 Despite organizational differences, the bodies are 
ultimately responsible to, and held accountable by, the local electorate.120 The 
fact that these land use regulators must answer to people on Election Day un-
doubtedly impacts their decisions.121 
The local officials in charge of overseeing the community’s land use mech-
anisms are politicians; they are not isolated from the public through long-term 
appointments, but instead face frequent elections.122 Therefore, these officials 
                                                                                                                           
limited powers; powers not delegated to the federal government in the Constitution are reserved to the 
states. U.S. CONST. amend. X. Because the Constitution does not mention local level land controls, 
those powers are regarded as being retained by the states, that then delegate them to cities and towns. 
See id. at art. I (enumerating the powers of the federal government and not listing the power to engage 
in land use regulation); Nolan, supra note 49, at 822, 827. The Commerce Clause however, gives the 
federal government the authority to engage in land use regulation in a limited fashion. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing “[t]he Congress shall have power to . . . regulate commerce . . . among 
the several states”); Nolon, supra note 49, at 825. 
 114 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5 (2016). Cities and towns possess essentially the same powers 
and responsibilities, but their internal structures differ. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 39, § 1 (2016) (provid-
ing cities and towns have the same powers and comparing the differing entities who wield the pow-
ers); Del Duca v. Town Adm’r of Methuen, 329 N.E.2d 748, 753 n.6 (Mass. 1975) (explaining that 
towns are traditionally governed directly by the people and, in contrast, cities are traditionally gov-
erned by the people through representatives). 
 115 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 5. 
 116 Id. §§ 12, 14. 
 117 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 39, § 1; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 12. 
 118 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 12. Zoning board of appeals members are typically appointed 
by the mayor (if the given municipality uses a mayoral structure) and must be confirmed by the city 
council or the board of selectmen. Id. The board is comprised of between three and five members with 
their term limits structured so that one person’s expires each year. Id. Board members can be removed 
for cause by the city council or board of selectmen. Id. 
 119 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 82 (2016) (cities); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43A, § 4 (2016) 
(towns). City councils consist of either seven or nine members who are elected and serve two-year 
terms. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 82 
 120 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 82 (cities); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43A, § 4 (towns). Although 
the zoning board of appeals is not directly accountable to residents through direct elections, they are 
indirectly accountable to the people by virtue of being appointed by a democratically elected legisla-
tive body. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 12. 
 121 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 12; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 82. 
 122 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40A, § 12; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 43, § 82. 
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usually act in a way that reflects the will of their constituents.123 Local officials 
are thus incentivized to respond to their communities’ needs and desires.124 More 
precisely, local officials respond to the needs and desires of those voters in the 
majority, a trend that is often problematic for minorities.125 Minority groups, by 
their definition, are especially vulnerable to discriminatory actions by local gov-
ernments.126 When a majority of a local electorate opposes an ethnic, religious, 
or other minority group, they can pressure their local government to restrict that 
minority group.127 Taken to the extreme, such restrictions can seriously infringe 
on the personal liberty of minority individuals.128 Once these discriminatory pol-
icies are entrenched into society, they are difficult to overcome.129 Minority 
groups often do not have the votes needed to influence local governments to pro-
tect their rights when a hostile majority is organized in opposition against 
them.130 
Muslims in the United States are in the minority and are therefore highly 
susceptible to discrimination from governments.131 Although all minority groups 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See Thad Kousser et al., Ideological Adaptation? The Survival Instinct of Threatened Legisla-
tors, 69 J. POL. 828, 829 (2007) (analyzing election trends and concluding threatened legislators modi-
fy behavior in response to ideological shifts by their constituents). 
 124 See Christine Keller Palus, Responsiveness in American Local Governments, 42 ST. & LOC. 
GOV’T REV. 133, 145 (2010) (concluding that local officials respond to the ideological views of their 
constituents); Politics and Local Government: Urbane Development, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/08/politics-and-local-government 
[https://perma.cc/7YZT-WDR6] [hereinafter Urbane Development] (examining instances where local 
governments took actions to reflect communities’ particular needs and desires). Local governments 
often enact measures and make decisions that are not based on the traditional partisan lines of federal 
and state level politics, but rather reflect the reality of the needs and expectations of the local commu-
nity. Urbane Development, supra. 
 125 See Sean McElwee, Why Voting Matters: Large Disparities in Turnout Benefit the Donor 
Class, DEMOS 10 (Sept. 16, 2015), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Why%
20Voting%20Matters_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/V59D-ETRT] (explaining politicians enact policies that 
benefit the population segments who vote most frequently, usually affluent whites, and noting this 
trend harms minorities). 
 126 See Minority, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining minorities as “group[s] 
that [are] different in some respect (such as race or religious belief) from the majority and that [are] 
sometimes treated differently as a result,” or who have been “traditionally discriminated against or 
socially suppressed”). 
 127 See id. 
 128 See, e.g., David Pilgrim, What Was Jim Crow, JIM CROW MUSEUM (2012), https://ferris.
edu/HTMLS/news/jimcrow/what/index.htm [https://perma.cc/6CB5-7EKS]. One of the most extreme 
examples of how local governments can take measures that restrict the rights of minority groups are 
the Jim Crow laws of the post-reconstruction American South. Id. These laws, passed by white South-
ern state governments, severely restricted blacks and other racial and ethnic minorities’ public behav-
ior. See id. 
 129 See id. (noting it took until the mid-1960s for Jim Crow legislation to be eradicated). 
 130 See McElwee, supra note 125 (explaining the lack of electoral power minority voters possess). 
 131 See Besheer Mohamed, A New Estimate of the U.S. Muslim Population, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
(Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/06/a-new-estimate-of-the-u-s-muslim-
population/ [https://perma.cc/H6DE-YRYQ] (estimating approximately three million Muslims lived in 
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are underrepresented in U.S. legislatures, the number of Muslim representatives is 
incredibly low; according to a 2015 study, fewer than six legislators across federal 
and state legislatures identified as Muslim.132 In the rare cases where a Muslim 
won a seat in a legislature, they often faced hostility during the election.133 
Anti-Islamic sentiments augment the problems that Muslims face by virtue 
of their numerical minority in government positions.134 Muslims simply cannot 
count on local officials to provide fair treatment for their building projects and 
proposals.135 Local officials can, and do, exercise their authority to either deny a 
proposal completely or delay the project in the hope of wearing out a particular 
Muslim group’s will and economic ability to continue the project.136 Because 
Muslims cannot always rely on local governments, they must turn to the courts 
to protect and enforce their rights.137 Unfortunately, the courts often fail to pro-
vide the necessary relief.138 
B. Uncertain and Unsatisfactory Judicial Remedies for  
Discrimination Against Muslims 
Local governments’ inability to treat religious minority groups fairly when 
making land use decisions was precisely why Congress enacted RLUIPA.139 
                                                                                                                           
the United States in 2015). Given the population of the United States is estimated to be approximately 
322 million, Muslims make up about one percent of the population. See id. 
 132 Karl Kurtz, Who We Elect: The Demographics of State Legislatures, NCSL (Dec. 1, 2015) 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/who-we-elect.aspx [https://perma.cc/RH7G-
YE5W]. The joint study, conducted by the National Conference of State Legislatures and the Pew 
Charitable Trusts, analyzed legislature demographics across the country. Id. The study determined 
that, although the number of minorities and women in legislatures has increased since the 1970s, their 
numbers still fall below the respective groups’ percentage of the U.S. population. Id. Women, who 
made up fifty-one percent of the U.S. population at the time, only had a twenty-five percent share of 
state legislatures. Id. Blacks, making up thirteen percent of the population, had nine percent. Id. As for 
religion, Protestant and Catholics were the most represented religions, coming in at thirty-eight per-
cent and sixteen percent respectively. Id. Only six percent of legislators reported being Buddhist, 
Hindu, or Muslim. Id. Forty-two percent of legislators chose not to identify their religion, so the actual 
numbers are likely somewhat different, though the overall trend is clear. See id. 
 133 See Teresa Wiltz, Why State Legislatures Are Still Pretty White, GOVERNING (Dec. 9, 2015), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/legislative-boundaries-lack-of-connections-lead-to-few-
minority-lawmakers.html [https://perma.cc/CM3F-4W94]. For example, opponents of Sam Rasoul, a 
Muslim running for the Virginia state legislature, circulated a pamphlet claiming that Rasoul had been 
funded by an al-Qaida sympathizer. Id. 
 134 See Zecca, supra note 81, at 276 (noting anti-Muslim sentiments present an additional obstacle 
for Muslims in the land use context). 
 135 See id. 
 136 See supra notes 8–28 and accompanying text. 
 137 See 42. U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(a) (2017) (providing a judicial remedy for religious groups in land 
use disputes). 
 138 See Zecca, supra note 81, at 277 (noting the shortcomings of judicial remedies in the land use 
context). 
 139 See id. at 276 (discussing Congress’s intent to curb religious land use discrimination through 
RLUIPA). 
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Specifically, RLUIPA prohibits land use regulations that impose a “substantial 
burden” on “religious exercise.”140 Congress however, did not clearly define 
what constitutes a “substantial burden” or what uses constitute a “religious exer-
cise.”141 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari to 
a case based on RLUIPA’s land use prong.142 As a result, courts presiding over 
RLUIPA litigation have defined “substantial burden” and “religious exercise” in 
slightly different ways.143 More problematically, courts have been reluctant to 
construe the meaning of these terms in a way that protects religious groups to the 
full extent that the law permits.144 It is therefore uncertain what remedies, if any, 
Muslims will receive upon challenging discriminatory land use decisions.145 
RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether 
or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,” and explains that 
“the use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious 
exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that 
uses or intends to use the property for that purpose.”146 Although this language is 
broad, it does not clearly define what specific uses and activities constitute “reli-
gious exercise.”147 While courts find many uses constitute “religious exercise” 
under RLUIPA, they do not find that all uses of land by religious organizations 
qualify as such.148 
In Westchester Day School v. Village of Mamaroneck (“Westchester II”), 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York deter-
mined that building an addition to a Jewish school was a religious exercise under 
RLUIPA.149 The court reasoned that the “major portion of the proposed facilities 
will be used for religious education and practice or are inextricably integrated 
                                                                                                                           
 140 42. U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). 
 141 See id. § 2000cc–5 (defining “religious exercise” but not “substantial burden”). 
 142 Zecca, supra note 81, at 283. As of 2017 the Supreme Court has still not heard a case on 
RLUIPA’s land use prong. 
 143 See Trinity Assembly of God of Balt. City, Inc. v. People’s Counsel for Balt. Cty., 962 A.2d 
404, 427 (Md. 2008) (discussing the different definitions of “substantial burden” across circuits); 
Tokufumi Noda, The Role of Economics in the Discourse on RLUIPA, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1095 
(2012) (recognizing that courts have developed different language for what constitutes a “substantial 
burden”). 
 144 See Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of Conn., Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Town of 
Newtown, 941 A.2d 868, 889–90 (Conn. 2008) (declining to give the broader meaning of “religious 
exercise” implied by RLUIPA); Zecca, supra note 81, at 277 (noting the shortcomings of courts’ in-
terpretations). 
 145 See Zecca, supra note 81, at 277. 
 146 42. U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7). 
 147 Id. 
 148 See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477, 545–46 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 504 F.3d 388 (2nd Cir. 2007) (Westchester II) (finding an addition to a religious 
school constitutes religious exercise); Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson v. City of Jackson, 733 
N.W.2d 734, 746 (Mich. 2007) (finding the building of an apartment building by a religious group 
was not religious exercise). 
 149 Westchester II, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 545–46. 
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with, and necessary for [the school’s] ability to provide religious education and 
practice.”150 Additionally, courts have not objected to the idea that displaying a 
sign visible to highway drivers constitutes a religious exercise.151 On the other 
hand, courts have not found that a religious organization’s plan to construct an 
apartment qualifies as a religious exercise.152 Because the definition does not 
specify what uses qualify, it is conceivable that courts could disagree whether a 
given use, such as a cemetery, constitutes “religious exercise.”153 
Whereas the meaning of “religious exercise” under RLUIPA is uncertain 
because it is broadly defined, the meaning of “substantial burden” is uncertain 
because there is no definition at all.154 Congress did not define “substantial bur-
den” in RLUIPA, but instead left it to be interpreted according to the United 
States Supreme Court’s established jurisprudence concerning the term.155 In 
Sherbert v. Verner, the Court explained that a substantial burden occurs when an 
individual is required to “choose between following the precepts of her religion 
and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of 
[their] religion . . . on the other hand.”156 Because Sherbert was not a land use 
case, it only provides a starting point for courts reviewing RLUIPA claims.157 
In light of the Supreme Court’s silence on the issue, the circuit courts have 
developed their own definition of substantial burden in the land use context.158 
Consequently, case law does not offer much guidance as to what exactly consti-
                                                                                                                           
 150 Id. Judge William C. Connor of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York wrote on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id. The 
Second Circuit had remanded his earlier decision because it held that decision, which found the pro-
ject to be a religious exercise simply because the school itself was religious, was an impermissibly 
broad construction of RLUIPA. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 386 F.3d 183, 190 
(2d Cir. 2004), remanded to 417 F. Supp. 2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 504 F.3d 388 (2nd Cir. 2007) 
(Westchester I) (first appellate review). The Second Circuit affirmed Judge Connor’s conclusion and 
reasoning the second time. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 348, 357 
(2d Cir. 2007) (Westchester III) (affirming Judge Connor in the second appellate review). 
 151 See Trinity Assembly of God, 962 A.2d at 427. The defendant city did not argue against the 
plaintiff church’s assertion that the sign was a religious exercise. Id. Accordingly, the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland assumed without deciding that it was a religious exercise. Id. 
 152 See Greater Bible Way Temple v. City of Jackson, 733 N.W.2d 734, 746 (Mich. 2007). 
 153 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7). 
 154 See id. § 2000cc–5. 
 155 See Westchester III, 504 F.3d at 348. 
 156 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); Westchester III, 504 F.3d at 348. 
 157 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399–400; Westchester III, 504 F.3d at 348–49 (explaining religious 
groups in land use contexts do not usually face the dilemma described in Sherbert). Sherbert v. Verner 
was a case centering on unemployment benefits. 374 U.S. at 399–400. 
 158 Trinity Assembly of God, 962 A.2d at 428. The Ninth Circuit requires that a land regulation be 
oppressive to a “significantly great extent” and impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon 
the exercise of religion. Id. (quoting Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. Cty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th 
Cir. 2006)). The Eleventh Circuit explained that a substantial burden “is akin to significant pressure 
which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly.” Id. (quoting 
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004)). 
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tutes a substantial burden.159 For example, in Trinity Assembly of God v. of Bal-
timore City, Incorporated v. People’s Counsel for Baltimore County, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland held that a decision preventing a church from placing a 
large sign on its property did not constitute a substantial burden.160 Similarly, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Midrash Sephardi, 
Incorporated v. Town of Surfside held that zoning requirements prohibiting a 
synagogue from remaining in a commercially zoned district did not pose a sub-
stantial burden on the exercise of religion, even though the requirements would 
force the synagogue to relocate to another area and make it difficult for its elder-
ly congregation to reach the new building.161 
In contrast to those decisions where the courts did not find a substantial 
burden was imposed, in Guru Nanak Sikh Society v. County of Sutter, the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that a denial of a condi-
tional use permit to build a Sikh temple did impose a substantial burden.162 Cen-
tral to the court’s reasoning in that case were the facts that it was the second de-
nial of such a permit and the denial greatly reduced the likelihood that the temple 
would ever be constructed.163 On the contrary, where religious groups have op-
tions to build elsewhere, courts are reluctant to find that a decision barring a pro-
ject on a specific site constitutes a substantial burden.164 These cases make clear 
that the question of what constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise 
will continue to differ across circuits absent review by the United States Su-
preme Court.165 
The uncertainty surrounding RLUIPA’s definition of “substantial burden” 
and “religious exercise” is magnified for religious groups seeking to construct 
cemeteries.166 Although RLUIPA itself has been extensively litigated since it 
became law, its applicability to cemeteries has not.167 Therefore, it is unclear 
                                                                                                                           
 159 See Trinity Assembly of God, 962 A.2d at 431 (examining different courts’ interpretations of 
RLUIPA). 
 160 Id. at 430. 
 161 Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1221, 1228; Zecca, supra note 81, at 286 (describing the Elev-
enth Circuit’s reasoning). 
 162 Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 456 F.3d at 992. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See id. (implying a denial of a project might not constitute a substantial burden when the reli-
gious group could build in other locations); see also Greater Bible Way Temple, 733 N.W.2d at 750 
(holding decision prohibiting church from building an apartment complex was not a substantial bur-
den because of availability of alternate locations). 
 165 See Zecca, supra note 81, at 277 (calling for the Supreme Court to review RLUIPA’s land use 
prong). 
 166 See Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., N.Y. v. Inc. Vill. of Old Westbury, 128 F. 
Supp. 3d 566, 585–86 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (analyzing RLUIPA’s application to a cemetery proposal). 
 167 See id. A Westlaw search as of August 19, 2017 for cases containing both the terms “RLUI-
PA” and “cemetery” yielded 174 results. Of those 174, only one case explored the question of whether 
government action restricting a church’s ability to construct a cemetery constituted a substantial bur-
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how a court would rule on a RLUIPA claim arising out of a cemetery proposal 
denial—such as in the Islamic Society’s case.168 
C. What RLUIPA Case Law Means for Muslim Cemeteries 
The limited case law discussing RLUIPA’s applicability to cemeteries sug-
gests that a court might find the denial of a Muslim group’s cemetery proposal to 
be a substantial burden on religious exercise.169 For example, in Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York v. Incorporated Village of Old Westbury, 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied a 
village’s motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff church’s RLUIPA 
claim concerning a proposed church cemetery.170 The court found that the vil-
lage’s imposition of permit conditions for the church’s proposed cemetery were 
sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of substantial burden.171 The court 
also found that material issues of fact remained as to the regulation’s burden on 
the church.172 Although this decision bodes well for a religious group, a denial of 
summary judgment by a federal district court is not particularly persuasive, and 
certainly not binding precedent for cases in other jurisdictions.173 
Despite these positive signs, certain aspects of RLUIPA case law suggest 
that a denial of a cemetery proposal might not constitute a substantial burden.174 
Although courts have ruled that denials of the right to build religious structures 
in a given location constitute a substantial burden in some cases, they have been 
reluctant to do so when a structure may be built elsewhere.175 Using this reason-
ing, a court reviewing a proposal like the one the Islamic Society put forth could 
conclude that the denial was not a substantial burden if it found the cemetery 
                                                                                                                           
den on the exercise of religion. See Roman Catholic Diocese, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 585–86. In compari-
son, a search for “RLUIPA” by itself yielded 5,696 cases. 
 168 See Roman Catholic Diocese, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 585–86. 
 169 See id. 
 170 Id. at 597. 
 171 Id. at 586. 
 172 Id. at 585. The village instituted a requirement that cemeteries obtain a special permit in re-
sponse to an increasing volume of permit applications the village had received. Id. at 574. Some of the 
required conditions related to minimum dimensional requirements that a lot must have in order to be 
eligible for a religious use. Id. at 575. A prima facie showing is one that on first appearance establish-
es some fact or conclusion, but remains subject to further evidence or information. Prima Facie, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 173 See Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L. J. 
787, 800 (2012) (explaining federal district courts are not bound by the decisions of other judges in 
their district). 
 174 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 456 F.3d at 992; Greater Bible Way Temple, 733 N.W.2d at 750. 
 175 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 456 F.3d at 992 (finding second permit denial to be a substantial 
burden because it greatly reduced the likelihood that the temple could be built); see also Greater Bible 
Way Temple, 733 N.W.2d at 750 (illustrating that, where religious groups have alternate locations 
readily available, courts are not as willing to find a substantial burden). 
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could simply be built elsewhere.176 Such a ruling would be in line with the deci-
sion in Midrash Sephardi where the court did not find a zoning regulation that 
required relocating a synagogue to be a substantial burden.177 
Courts have thus far failed to apply RLUIPA in a way that consistently pro-
tects Muslim’s rights, thereby allowing discrimination against them in land use 
cases to continue.178 The judicial remedies for aggrieved Muslims are therefore 
unpredictable and unsatisfactory.179 Without change, religious groups such as the 
Islamic Society will remain highly vulnerable to discrimination in the land use 
context.180 
III. REMEDIES TO ALLOW MUSLIMS TO REST IN PEACE 
The problems Muslims face under the current land use regulatory frame-
work are twofold: first, the framework’s politicized nature enables discrimina-
tion and, second, the uncertain and unsatisfactory judicial remedies due to the 
lack of clear definitions for RLUIPA’s “substantial burden” and “religious exer-
cise” provisions.181 Because of the lack of clear definitions, Muslim groups such 
as the Islamic Society cannot predict whether a cemetery would even qualify for 
RLUIPA’s protections.182 Moreover, by the time courts get involved in religious 
land use cases, municipal land use regulators may have already delayed the pro-
jects for months or even years183 These problems highlight the fact that Muslims 
are not sufficiently protected under the current land use regulatory framework.184 
Despite these problems, RLUIPA has the potential to adequately protect re-
ligious land uses.185 With certain amendments, RLUIPA would better protect 
Muslims from discrimination by local land use regulatory bodies.186 According-
                                                                                                                           
 176 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 456 F.3d at 992. 
 177 See Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1228. 
 178 See Zecca, supra note 81, at 277. 
 179 See id. 
 180 See id. 
 181 See id. 
 182 See Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., N.Y. v. Inc. Vill. of Old Westbury, 128 F. 
Supp. 3d 566, 585–86, (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Trinity Assembly of God of Balt. City, Inc. v. People’s 
Counsel for Balt. Cty., 962 A.2d 404, 431 (Md. 2008). 
 183 See supra notes 8–28 and accompanying text. 
 184 See Zecca, supra note 81, at 277. 
 185 See id. at 278 (arguing for continued adherence to RLUIPA). 
 186 See id. As RLUIPA is a federal law, Congress has the authority to make amendments to its provi-
sions. RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RES. SERV., RS20617, HOW BILLS AMEND STATUTES 1 (2003). 
Amendments can change the law by inserting new text, striking existing text, or striking text and replac-
ing it with new text. Id. An amendment to RLUIPA would occur as any other bill becomes law: it would 
be introduced by either a senator or representative, go through the committee process, and appear for a 
vote before the entire body. See id. Then, if it passes, it would go to the other branch and the process 
would repeat. See id. If the amendment passed both houses, it would become law provided the President 
did not veto it. See How Laws Are Made and How to Research Them, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/
how-laws-are-made [https://perma.cc/4UAC-DRNX]; see also TheGreatWorker, I’m Just a Bill (School-
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ly, Congress should amend RLUIPA to provide a definition of “substantial bur-
den” that offers broad religious protections and does not view a given municipal 
action in isolation, but rather considers the totality of the circumstances in each 
case.187 Additionally, Congress should provide a clearer and more expansive def-
inition as to what activities constitute “religious exercise” and explicitly include 
cemeteries.188 Finally, Congress should add a provision that penalizes municipal 
governments for unduly delaying, stalling, or prolonging the approval process 
for religious land uses and allow religious groups to recover damages and attor-
ney’s fees.189 These amendments will help clarify the meaning of what consti-
tutes a substantial burden on religious exercise, streamline and provide predicta-
bility for RLUIPA litigation, and dissuade local land use regulatory bodies from 
engaging in deliberate stalling tactics.190 With these changes, Muslims’ right to 
construct cemeteries can finally be protected.191 
A. Creating a Substantial Burden Definition that Accounts for  
the Totality of the Circumstances 
To provide uniformity in interpreting RLUIPA across jurisdictions and to 
adequately protect Muslims’ rights to construct cemeteries, Congress must 
amend RLUIPA to provide a definition of “substantial burden.”192 Taken togeth-
er, the existing circuit court decisions offer a strong baseline upon which Con-
gress should develop its statutory definition.193 In order to provide the strongest 
protections for religious groups, Congress should draw on aspects from the rea-
                                                                                                                           
house Rock!), YOUTUBE (Sept. 1, 2008), https://youtube/tyeJ55o3El0 [https://perma.cc/T6R4-P5ML] 
(outlining the process of bills becoming laws). 
 187 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5 (2017); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cty. of Sutter, 456 
F.3d 978, 991 (9th Cir. 2006). Currently, RLUIPA only defines the terms “claimant,” “demonstrates,” 
“Free Exercise Clause,” “government,” “land use regulation,” “program or activity,” and “religious 
exercise.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5. 
 188 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7). RLUIPA defines religious exercise as “any exercise of religion, 
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,” and provides that “[t]he use, 
building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise shall be considered to be 
religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that purpose.” Id. 
The specific uses that satisfy this definition are not enumerated. See id. 
 189 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 456 F.3d at 991; Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 
417 F. Supp. 2d 477, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 504 F.3d 388 (2nd Cir. 2007) (Westchester II). 
 190 See Zecca, supra note 81, at 277. 
 191 See id. at 276–77. 
 192 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1); Zecca, supra note 81, at 276. 
 193 See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 349 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Westchester III); Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 456 F.3d at 988–89; Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of 
Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chi., 
342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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soning of several circuit and state court decisions.194 Accordingly, Congress 
should amend RLUIPA to expressly state that a substantial burden occurs when: 
an action, based on the totality of the circumstances, imposes such a 
restriction or limitation on religious exercise that either: (i) coerces 
adherents to alter their religious conduct in a way that significantly 
impedes their religious precepts, practices, or traditions; or (ii) renders 
the use of the land for religious exercise effectively impracticable.195 
This definition protects religious groups’ rights in a way that is consistent 
with previous RLUIPA decisions.196 Prong (i) ties the definition to the Supreme 
Court’s traditional understanding of what constitutes a substantial burden as 
originally expressed in Sherbert.197 The Court’s traditional interpretation empha-
sized that actions that coerced or pressured an individual to abandon or act con-
trary to their religion imposed a substantial burden.198 Where government ac-
tions result in such coercion, it clearly constitutes a substantial burden.199 Given 
the reality that land use regulations often will not involve such clear instances of 
choosing between religious precepts and government approval, the definition 
should also include prong (ii).200 
Under prong (ii), a substantial burden would be found—even if prong (i) 
was not satisfied—so long as the government action would render the use of the 
land for religious exercise effectively impracticable.201 By allowing a substantial 
burden to be found when the use of the land for religious exercise is made effec-
tively impracticable, the proposed definition takes a more pragmatic approach by 
focusing on the effect of the land use decision.202 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 456 F.3d at 988–89; Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1227; Civil 
Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 761. 
 195 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 456 F.3d at 988–89 (explaining the burden must be “significant” 
to be substantial and considering external circumstances in the analysis); Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d 
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 196 See Trinity Assembly of God, 962 A.2d at 428 (outlining differing courts’ definitions of sub-
stantial burden). 
 197 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). 
 198 Id. 
 199 See id. 
 200 See Westchester III, 504 F.3d at 348–49 (explaining land use contexts often do not involve the 
dilemma described in Sherbert). 
 201 See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 761 (providing the effectively impractica-
ble language). 
 202 See id. 
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The proposed definition, as a whole, requires a “substantial burden” to be 
determined based on the totality of the circumstances.203 An analysis of a sub-
stantial burden cannot view the government action in isolation and ignore the 
factual setting in which such decisions take place.204 This analysis will ensure 
that municipal governments cannot accomplish discriminatory ends through 
carefully crafted actions that might not constitute a substantial burden under a 
less rigorous definition.205 
Moreover, by focusing on the municipal action’s impact on the likelihood 
that a religious group will be able to use the land for religious exercise, the pro-
posed definition eliminates the heightened showing requirements necessary in 
some circuits.206 For example, religious groups should not have to show that 
municipal government acted arbitrarily and capriciously as the Second Circuit in 
Westchester III implied.207 These required showings are an advantage for local 
governments and make it harder for religious groups to establish a substantial 
burden because such showings are often difficult to make.208 Likewise, though 
the Ninth Circuit’s willingness in Guru Nanak to consider the factual reality be-
yond the particular municipal action at issue is admirable, religious groups 
should not have to exhaust all other options and show that a particular plot of 
land and building project is the only way they would be able to exercise their 
religion.209 
The proposed definition removes these hurdles and makes it easier for reli-
gious groups to show that a municipal action imposes a substantial burden.210 
Under the definition, when a local government’s decision renders the use of the 
land for religious exercise effectively impracticable, it has imposed a substantial 
burden.211 This definition would protect religious groups such as the Islamic So-
ciety because the town of Dudley’s denial of the cemetery rendered the use of 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 456 F.3d at 991 (finding the fact that the land use decision in 
question was the second denial of the proposal made it very unlikely the temple would be built and 
viewing that finding as key to the substantial burden determination). 
 204 See id. 
 205 See id. 
 206 See Westchester III, 504 F.3d at 350–51; Zecca, supra note 81, at 277. 
 207 See 504 F.3d at 350–51 (finding proof that the municipality acted arbitrarily or capriciously rele-
vant to substantial burden claim). 
 208 See id. at 351. 
 209 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 456 F.3d at 989–91. In Guru Nanak Sikh Society, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that a denial of a special permit for a proposed Sikh temple was a substantial burden because 
the local government had denied the groups’ prior permit proposal. Id. In that case, it was the last 
available parcel of land in the area reasonably suited for the project, and the municipality’s failure to 
give a reasoned explanation for the denials indicated the arbitrary and capricious nature of their ac-
tions. Id. Therefore, the denial in that instance was a substantial burden because “to a significantly 
great extent[, it] lessened the possibility that future [special permit] applications would be successful.” 
Id. at 989. 
 210 See id. at 989–91. 
 211 See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 761. 
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the land for religious exercise—here its use as a Muslim cemetery—effectively 
impracticable.212 Therefore, under the proposed definition, the town imposed a 
substantial burden and RLUIPA would require a court to overturn the action.213 
Although the proposed definition bolsters the rights of religious groups to 
build on their land, it still leaves room for a municipality to control how its land 
is used.214 Denial of a project with a request for more information might not nec-
essarily constitute a substantial burden where the denial is temporary and is im-
posed to require the group to respond to a problem or provide more information 
as to the proposal’s impact.215 Moreover, a municipality would still be able to 
deny a project outright provided it could satisfy RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny re-
quirements.216 Therefore, while the proposed definition secures the rights of reli-
gious groups, it does not totally muzzle municipal land use powers.217 
B. Enumerating What Land Uses Constitute Religious Exercise 
Defining what constitutes a substantial burden will help resolve the dispari-
ties between the circuit court definitions.218 Nonetheless, to firmly protect reli-
gious groups against land use mechanisms targeting their practices, Congress 
should also amend RLUIPA to include a more expansive and clear definition as 
to what activities constitute religious exercise.219 RLUIPA, as currently formu-
lated, defines “religious exercise” as “any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief” and explains “the use, 
building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of religious exercise 
shall be considered to be religious exercise of the person or entity that uses or 
intends to use the property for that purpose.”220 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See id.; supra notes 8–28 and accompanying text (describing how the town of Dudley’s ac-
tions before the eventual settlement prevented the Islamic Society from using the land for religious 
exercise). 
 213 See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 761. 
 214 See Westchester III, 504 F.3d at 349. 
 215 See id. (noting where “there is a reasonable opportunity for the institution to submit a modified 
application, the denial does not place substantial pressure on it to change its behavior and thus does 
not constitute a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion”). 
 216 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (providing the exception to the general rule when the govern-
ment can satisfy the strict scrutiny test). If, for example, a court determined that concerns over 
groundwater contamination from bodies buried without caskets was indeed a compelling government 
interest, a municipality might be able to prevent that specific practice. See id. That being said, the 
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 217 See id. 
 218 See Trinity Assembly of God, 962 A.2d at 428. 
 219 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–5(7). 
 220 Id. 
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The current definition of religious exercise is already fairly broad, but it is 
nevertheless problematic.221 It potentially protects a broader range of religious 
exercise than that recognized by the United States Supreme Court in its tradi-
tional First Amendment jurisprudence and some lower courts have been reluc-
tant to adopt such a broad interpretation.222 Furthermore, the lack of an enumer-
ated list of what activities Congress intended to qualify as religious exercise in-
evitably allows courts to disagree as to whether a particular activity should be 
protected.223 
Congress can easily remedy these potential issues by amending RLUIPA to 
enumerate certain activities that constitute religious exercise.224 Specifically, 
Congress should amend RLUIPA’s definition section outlining “religious exer-
cise” to add: 
(C) Examples: Examples of the types of land uses that constitute reli-
gious exercise include, but are not limited to: (i) Churches, temples, 
mosques or other houses of worship used for hosting regular religious 
services. (ii) Schools or other education facilities used for religious 
education or practice or inextricably integrated with, and necessary 
for providing religious education and practice. (iii) Cemeteries, burial 
grounds, and other places used for the interment, storage, or disposal 
of human remains in accordance with religious tradition, practice, or 
belief. (iv) Any other use in accordance with the terms and provisions 
of subsection 7, parts (A) and (B) of this section.225 
The enumeration of these uses would not result in any significant changes to the 
types of uses that qualify for RLUIPA’s protection, as courts have already recog-
nized many of these activities as religious exercises.226 
Like the proposed definition of substantial burden, the proposed amend-
ment to the definition of religious exercise would serve to reduce uncertainty, 
streamline litigation, and dissuade municipal governments from unduly delaying 
or denying religious building projects.227 Given the inherently expansive nature 
of RLUIPA’s current formulation of religious exercise, courts have been reluc-
tant to adopt the most expansive definition and inconsistent as to what types of 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of Conn., Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Town of 
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 224 See id. 
 225 See id.; Westchester II, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 545–46. 
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activities qualify.228 By explicitly identifying the most common land uses that 
courts have deemed religious exercises, the proposed amendment will help alle-
viate some of the confusion.229 Additionally, the proposed definition would help 
streamline litigation by providing courts with clear guidelines to follow.230 When 
the specific land use in question is defined in the statute, the issue of whether a 
certain use constitutes a religious exercise would likely not need to be litigated in 
any significant detail.231 Rather, the issue could be adjudicated early on at the 
summary judgment stage, allowing RLUIPA litigation to be completed much 
more efficiently.232 Furthermore, delineating what is a religious exercise would 
help prevent courts from blending the analysis between “religious exercise” and 
“substantial burden.”233 Finally, if municipalities knew that a proposed land use 
clearly qualifies as a religious exercise, they would be less likely to deny or de-
lay a proposed religious building project in the hopes that a court would rule in 
their favor.234 All of these benefits would come without any significant substan-
tive changes to the law.235 
Defining “religious exercise” to expressly include cemeteries would help 
ensure that religious groups such as the Islamic Society have an adequate place 
to bury their dead—the right that RLUIPA was intended to protect.236 The lim-
ited litigation in federal courts over whether cemeteries qualify as religious exer-
cise offers a promising outlook that they would ultimately qualify for RLUIPA’s 
protections under its current definition.237 Nonetheless, Congress should still 
include cemeteries in a list of examples of religious exercise to settle the issue 
once and for all.238 
                                                                                                                           
 228 See Westchester III, 504 F.3d at 347 (explaining situations where building projects would and 
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C. Imposing a Penalty on Local Governments for Unduly Delaying 
Religious Land Use Applications 
Even if Congress amends RLUIPA to provide a definition for “substantial 
burden” and supplements the definition for “religious exercise,” the rights of 
religious groups to construct their building projects will not be totally secure.239 
Local governments have the power to unnecessarily delay or prolong land use 
proceedings to impose a pseudo war of attrition against building proposals the 
municipality opposes.240 The ability of local governments to undertake stalling 
tactics is an inherent consequence of a framework that places power to decide 
how the community’s land is to be used in the hands of local politicians who are 
especially interested in responding to the will of their constituencies.241 If a par-
ticular community, perhaps one inflamed by anti-Muslim sentiments, decided 
they did not want a Muslim building project to be approved, local officials might 
not be able to resist the pressure to deny the project.242 
Despite the fact that a local government would likely lose the eventual bat-
tle in court and be required to approve the building project based on RLUIPA’s 
merits, religious groups would face a long, arduous, and expensive road to get a 
favorable court decision.243 Before a dispute gets to court, municipal land use 
regulatory bodies can hold repeated hearings, demand complex and incredibly 
detailed factual reports, make temporary denials of a proposal, and require re-
submissions of modified proposals—all before outright denying the project.244 
Once a case enters the court system, it faces further delays because of crowded 
dockets and clogged judicial calendars.245 The complete process for a religious 
group to overcome a hostile municipal government in the court system can take 
months or even years to resolve and often requires a group to spend untold 
amounts of money in legal fees and other required expenses.246 Realistically, 
some religious groups simply do not have the resources or time to undertake 
                                                                                                                           
 239 See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y, 456 F.3d at 991 (recognizing government’s actions can result in 
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such a lengthy and expensive process, which allows municipalities to accom-
plish discriminatory objectives even if they would ultimately lose in court.247 
To account for this concerning reality, Congress must also amend RLUIPA 
to create a penalty for such deliberate stalling tactics.248 The proposed amend-
ment must be sufficiently forceful and contain such negative consequences that 
municipalities would be dissuaded from engaging in these tactics.249 Therefore, 
the amendment should allow religious groups to recover the costs incurred in 
supporting their proposal, as well as punitive damages.250 Congress should 
phrase the amendment to read: 
wherever a religious group can show, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, a government intentionally delayed, stalled, or otherwise pro-
longed the land use regulatory process in opposition to a valid use of 
land for religious exercise, such religious group shall be entitled to re-
cover the expenses, including attorney’s fees, made in furtherance of 
the proposal, as well as punitive damages.251 
A remedy that merely requires a municipality to approve a religious group’s 
project—which is the current remedy under RLUIPA—does not go far enough to 
ensure that religious groups will actually be protected from discrimination by 
local governments.252 The proposed penalty addresses this shortcoming of 
RLUIPA’s current formulation.253 Although the proposed penalty requires addi-
tional judicial proceedings and may further delay a given controversy’s ultimate 
resolution, the possible benefit to religious groups, as well as the effect on the 
conduct of local government, is worth the additional time.254 Moreover, the other 
proposed amendments will make RLUIPA litigation more streamlined and effi-
cient.255 Therefore, the additional proceedings required for the penalty amend-
ment may not necessarily result in a net increase of litigation.256 
Without an additional threat of punishment, local governments will contin-
ue to exploit the land use regulatory framework to block projects for discrimina-
tory reasons.257 The proposed penalty will ensure that municipal governments 
follow the law and honor the rights of religious groups to exercise their reli-
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gion.258 The overall effect of these proposed amendments will help to secure the 
rights of Muslims to build cemeteries and other religious structures, curb dis-
crimination by local governments, and give Muslims a chance to recover ex-
penses furnished in fighting discriminatory decisions.259 
CONCLUSION 
Muslims attempting to build cemeteries in the United States face significant 
challenges arising from the convergence of several unfortunate realities. The 
American land use regulatory framework is executed at the local level by munic-
ipal governments, entities that by and large do not include or represent the wish-
es of Muslims. Elected land use regulatory officials are held accountable to the 
interests of their constituents, who, fueled by pervasive anti-Muslim sentiments, 
do not want Muslims in their communities. To protect religious land uses, Con-
gress passed RLUIPA to prevent local governments from engaging in land use 
actions that impose a substantial burden on religious exercise. Nonetheless, giv-
en the elusive nature of the meanings of these terms, the lack of guidance from 
the United States Supreme Court, and the statutory language, lower courts creat-
ed their own definitions. These problems, in conjunction with the lack of case 
law on RLUIPA’s applicability to cemeteries, have led to unpredictable and un-
satisfactory results for Muslim groups seeking to build cemeteries. 
To protect the rights of Muslims and other religious groups to build ceme-
teries and other religious structures, Congress must amend RLUIPA. Congress 
needs to provide a definition for what constitutes a substantial burden that re-
flects both the Supreme Court’s traditional jurisprudence as well as the reality of 
a land use decision’s impact by viewing municipal government actions in light 
of the totality of the circumstances. Congress also needs to expand the existing 
definition of religious exercise to include examples of the specific land uses in-
cluding cemeteries, which qualify for RLUIPA’s protections. These definitions 
will help to streamline and even perhaps dissuade litigation. Finally, Congress 
must amend RLUIPA to include a penalty for local governments that unduly de-
lay or prolong land use proceedings in an attempt to erode the willpower, time, 
and resources of religious groups. 
It is the unfortunate reality of our time that American Muslims face unfair 
treatment, discrimination, and violence. Federal law cannot comprehensively 
guarantee that Muslims can live peaceful lives free from discrimination and os-
tracism because of their religion, but it can guarantee that they can do so in 
death. Changes to RLUIPA can ensure that Muslim organizations such as the 
Islamic Society can achieve their last wishes: to be buried according to the tradi-
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tions of their faith in the land they have called home, and in so doing—to rest in 
peace. 
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